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TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LIBYAN CONFLICT OF 2011

"From Tunisia to Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain to Yemen and beyond, the people of this region are demanding new rights and freedoms and the international community must stand firm against this situation. The United Nations Charter clearly says we have a collective duty to advocate for the rights, social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. "

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his   General Assembly speech,   1 March 2011

1.   Geographical aspects
1.1. Geography of the region

Official name: Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Capital: Tripoli

Population: 6,546,000(2010 est.)

Area: 1,777,060 Km²

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica.

Libya is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on the north, Egypt on the east, The Sudan on the southeast, Niger and Chad on the south, and Tunisia and Algeria on the west. Being the fourth in size among the countries of the African continent and the seventeenth of the world, most of its territory is covered by the Sahara. Lately in the 1950's the discovery of petroleum lead to an immense wealth. Its land boundaries are composed of 4,348km and its coastline of 1,770km. Tripolitania, in the northwest, is Libya's most important agricultural region and its most populated area. The production and export of petroleum are the basis of Libya's economy, given the country has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa; other resources include natural gas, manganese, and gypsum. It is important to highlight the fact that the Eastern part of the country is richer in gas, and the western part in petroleum.

1.2. Geography of the involved actors

In order to facilitate the analysis of the roles and positions of the involved actors, next there is a brief description of their geographical aspects.

(Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2011).

The Maghreb is located in North Africa and bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The Africa Minor of the ancients, it at one time included Moorish Spain and now comprises essentially the Atlas Mountains and the coastal plain of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

Given the geographical diversity of its members, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has outstanding action capabilities. The important amount of military bases of the alliance allows it to act quickly and effectively in regions such as the Maghreb. Its geographical tactics give the NATO military advantage greatly because of the fact that it has air, naval and ground forces in grand quantity and quality.

2. Historical aspects

2.1. History of the region

Libya is located in the region of the Maghreb, which consists of the Northern part of Africa that borders with the Mediterranean Sea. The region has an historical relevance that comes from the times of the Roman Empire, as well as being a start point for the process of colonization in Africa. The Maghreb also played a fundamental role as a key geopolitical area during the first and the second world wars and was therefore the motif of many military conflicts between the disputing European powers of the time. Beside from its geopolitical weight, the Maghreb has very important oil reserves and has gained a far more relevant position given that it is the fixed point through which migratory fluxes from Africa come into Europe.

2.2. History of the conflict

Since the beginning of 2011 a series of popular movements in the African continent and the Middle East began to develop with the main propose of changing their respective ruling regime. Libya was not the exception; the country, controlled for over 42 years by Muammar Qaddafi, is being struck by a civil war between two entities that are claiming the popular legitimacy of the government. The Benghazi-based Transitional National Council, which is composed by the rebels and led by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, former justice minister under Qaddafi's regime, refers to the country as The Libyan Republic; the other, which is composed by the government of Gaddafi, whom refers to the state as the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In February 2011, the revolt in Libya exploded and the National Transitional Council managed to establish important areas (oil rich Eastern Libya) under rebel control. By March, much of the eastern cities were out of the government's control, soldiers were mobilizing in support of the rebels, and several international medias were criticizing the attacks of Qaddafi's forces against the rebels; Qaddafi's was calling his supporters to "clean" the Libyan territory from the protesters.

The government's sudden escalation of violence against protesters and other civilians drew international condemnation from foreign leaders and human rights organizations. It also damaged the coherence of the regime, causing a number of high-level officials, including the minister of justice and a number of senior Libyan diplomats, to resign in protest or issue statements condemning the regime. A number of the Libyan embassies around the world began flying Libya's pre-Qaddafi flag as a way to show their support to the uprising. Beyond this, Qaddafi's support also seemed to hesitate in some segments of the military; for example, as the Libyan air force carried out attacks against demonstrators, two Libyan fighter pilots flew their jets to Malta, choosing to defect rather than obey orders to bomb Banghazi.

The international pressure on the Qaddafi regime continued. On March 3rd, the chief prosecutor of the ICC announced that the court would investigate Qaddafi and members of his inner circle for alleged crimes against humanity.

As Qaddafi appeared to gain power over the territory, the international community continued to debate possible diplomatic and military responses to the developing conflict. Countries worked to establish contact with the Interim Transitional National

Council, although France, Italy and Qatar granted it official recognition, announcing on March 10th that they would treat the council as Libya's legitimate government.

However, the international community remained divided over the possibility of the use of force, in the form of a no-fly zone over Libya, a measure long requested by the rebels to prevent Qaddafi loyalists from launching air attacks. Some countries, including France and the United Kingdom, signaled their support for such an operation, while others, including the United States and Germany, expressed their reservations, emphasizing the need for broad international consensus and warning against possible unforeseen consequences of a military intervention. The African Union rejected any military intervention in Libya, asserting that the crisis should be resolved through negotiations, whereas the Arab League passed a resolution on March 13th calling on the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya.

The UN Security Council voted on March 17th to authorize military action, including a no-fly zone to protect Libyan civilians. The Qaddafi regime responded by declaring an immediate cease-fire, although there were reports that pro-Qaddafi forces allegedly continued to launch attacks after the announcement and that fighting continued in Banghazi. Beginning March 19th, a coalition of U.S. and European forces with warplanes and cruise missiles attacked targets in Libya in an effort to disable Libya's air force and air defense systems so that the U.N. authorized no-fly zone could be imposed. By March 18th, an international coalition that included the USA, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, among others, began an air and sea attack Libyan military centers.

On March 27th the NATO officially took command of military operations previously directed by the USA, France, and the United Kingdom in Libya. The handover came after several days of debate among NATO countries over the limits of international military intervention; several countries argued that the coalition's aggressive targeting of pro-Qaddafi ground forces had exceeded the mandate set by the UN Security Council to protect civilians.

During the following days and after a few significant gains of the rebels aided by the NATO forces, the momentum shifted from the rebels to the Qaddafi forces; the rebels were pushed back to the Eastern part of the country and the conflict began facing a stalemate.

On April 7th, the NATO attacked a rebel tank convoy near the oil town of Brega, presumably confounding them with forces loyal to Qaddafi, killing 13 men. It was the second case of friendly fire in a period of approximately a week. According to the New York Times, at the same time international diplomats met with the rebel leaders in the rebel central city of Benghazi. On April 10th delegates of the African Union sent to negotiate a ceasefire between the rebels and the forces of Qaddafi, announced that the former accepted the mediation process and was willing to make a ceasefire. The AU delegation is due to meet with the rebels on Monday 11th. However, to this date the exact terms of the agreement process are still unclear.

3.   Social and Political aspects
3.1. Involved actors: their interests and social structures

The analysis of the diverse interests of the actors involved in the recent conflict in Libya is fundamental in understanding the way the situation has developed, as well as identifying the possible outcomes of the situation.

The first clear actor is **Libya**, a state with a relevant geopolitical location in relation to the European Union and the Maghreb (relation highly important in terms of the oil resources Libya has and its key role as a fixed point in the migration fluxes that come from Africa into Europe), as well as a prominent position amidst the African continent and especially within the African Union. Libya's government is in the form of an authoritarian state with one policy-making body (Great General People's Congress). The current situation in Libya is a clear example of an internal conflict emerged from the confrontation between an established undemocratic regime (leaded by **Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi)** that has suppressed the development of political diversity, and the opposition to such *status quo.* However, the rebel forces that are claiming to be the joint concentration of the opposition (recently self-called the **Transitional National Council**) have still unclear stands, capabilities and origins; however, they have control over oil rich areas of Eastern Libya and have reserves of over one million barrels which are being exported to through an agreement with Qatar (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/04/20114711651619495.html) The social structure of the Qaddafi regime in Libya is currently that of an autocratic state which defines itself as Arab and in accordance to the Revolutionary discourse of the ideological premises established by Qaddafi from the beginnings of his rule (comprised in his *Green Book*). The interests of both parties in conflict are not totally ***antagonist*** which, in relation to Shelling's work *Arms and Influence*, makes possible a degree of ***bargaining*** that is being conducted by the UA to reach a diplomatic resolution on the basis that both sides have an interest in the cease of hostilities, even when their very different long term objectives require a more profound process of negotiation.

The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** is a security oriented alliance of several nations that first came into existence because of the bipolar confrontation during the Cold War. Regarded nowadays as the most highly equipped and trained international coalition of security nature, NATO has often played crucial roles in various contemporary conflicts, such as the war in the Balkans during between 1994 and 1995, and Afghanistan (2001-). The NATO is constituted by 28 members and several partner countries that include states of central Asia, the Mediterranean and 4 Arab nations of the Gulf region. However, in the current situation, it is important to make a further analysis of France, the United States of America and Turkey.

The **United States of America** is a country with a democratic and representative political constitution. However, the wide range of economical interests is also a very important determinant of its actions. Given Libya's strategic geopolitical location and its position in the oil market, the USA clearly has a lot in stake in the conflict.

With the Bush administration, the degree isolation of Libya by the world community reduced greatly because of commercial deals related to oil, mainly formalized during 2007. The UE was also part of the changes in the perception of the Qaddafi regime in

form of the lifting of some of the previous economic sanctions imposed to Libya in past years. However, with the transition in the US government and the emergence of violence in Libya, the posture of the US and its allies took a completely different course. Initially, it took a stand of rejection to the governmental policies in Libya that were leading to the targeting of civilians during the first stages of the protests in the country. Later, the USA's **discourse** escalated from **threats and coercive** to the point of demanding the immediate oust from power of Muammar al-Qaddafi. From then on, and with the Security Council's resolution that approved the use of force to protect civilians and stop the violence in Libya, the USA began using force upon what it called the necessity to protect civilians that were being targeted by the Qaddafi. On April 7th, the day of the attack of NATO to a rebel tank convoy, the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated that President Barack Obama had declined the personal appeal dent to him by Qaddafi, and re-stated that he must impose a ceasefire, cease all use of violence and go into exile.

France is probably the most assertive member of the coalition in terms of the discourse it has maintained since the beginning of the turmoil in Libya, promoting the no-fly zone and then the military intervention. France is a country with a democratic government system that generally has a great deal of participation in the processes of resolving world conflicts, and that is now facing Sarkozy's campaign for internal approbation. In the case of Libya, France's interests can be defined from economical to political and strategic; being a country of the Mediterranean and the destination of very large African migration fluxes, France has a particular interest in keeping the region stable. This, however, did not impeded French President to make approaches to Qaddafi's regime during 2007 and declare that he was not a dictator. On March 10th, France recognized the rebel forces in Libya, the National Libyan Council as the legitimate government entity of the country.

Turkey, a democratic parliamentary regime, and the only Muslim state within NATO, has made emphatic declarations against the use of force. This lack of consensus within the organization has played a key role in the apparent indecision and unclearness its actual actions and campaigns. Turkey has also attempted to keep talks with both the rebels and the Gaddafi government; it emerged as the latest state to offer an alternative diplomatic solution. Its most outstanding interests are those of acquiring international presence and prestige to facilitate its long struggle to become a member of the UE.

Italy has a democratic regime and its interests are more specifically of geopolitical nature. It is involved not only as a part of NATO, but as the destination point of many of the refugees fleeing the conflict. This makes it have very specific interest in the unfolding of the situation, having declared in the past a urge to reduce the quantity of refugees the country is receiving.

The **European Union** is an actor that in the past has frequently imposed economic and political sanctions on Libya for its reported violations of human rights and democratic principles. Over the last decades, the EU has experienced several momentums in its relation to Libya. However, with the emergence of conflict with the opposition that generated violence against civilian population, the EU modify its former policies for Libya, which were more close to **appeasement than to coercion**, and

joined the UN and US demands of immediate cease of hostilities and democratization process.

The **African Union** has an historic linkage to Gaddafi's rule given that Libya was a founding member of the organization. The stand it has taken evolved around the notion of self-determination and sovereignty of the Libyan people, and therefore the rejection of any kind of intervention of the Western powers.

The **Arab League** has taken a much higher role during the last conflicts in Egypt and Libya than that which it had had during the years subsequent to its creation. The fact that the Arab world is facing such a strong period of structural changes brings about the importance of the region and its international organizations and coalitions. The Arab League pronounced in pro of a no-fly zone to protect civilians, but made clear emphases that they should be no intervention in the country.

The **United Nations** first acted to condemn the eruption of violence in Libya in accordance to its principles of protection to civil population and prevention of humanitarian crises; however, as reports of escalated violence against unarmed civilians that were demonstrating against the Qaddafi regime, the UN changed its posture to a more coercive one. In this sense, the organs of the UN that played the most significant roles were, in some degree, the Human Rights Council, but more importantly the Security Council and its authorization of a no-fly zone over Libya and the use of force to protect civilians (Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya).

4.   Psycho-social aspects
4.1. Perceptions of the population about itself, its government and its future

With the Revolution of 1969, the **national identity** of the Libyan people came to be defined by the socialist and nationalist principles of leader Muammar Qaddafi, described in its *Green Book.*

To analyze the social perception of the Libyan people the Qaddafi is rather difficult given the diversity of the political orientation in the reports about this topic. However, it is evidently clear that the Libyan population remains divided in terms of the two sides in dispute for the political control of the state and that the up growing of dissidents over the last years was a key factor for the start of the rebellion. In relation to its current state, it is possible to identify two main groups within the Libyan society: the loyalists and the rebels. The loyalists have a strong tie with the revolutionary ideas set by Qaddafi and stated in his *Green Book* that claim the supremacy of Islam and the religious spirit over the spirit of nationalism, to which it also gives a high degree of importance. Qaddafi's ideological basis for the construction of the Libyan society is a convergence of Islamic principles, Bedouin morality and socialism. However, the regime also imposed a very strict control over freedom of expression and association, even to the point of brutal repression of insurrection during the whole period Qaddafi has been in power.

The tight control of the government over the population dictates its perception of the regime; one thing that is most interesting, is that despite the complete absence of democratic processes and principles, Qaddafi had managed to sustain a significant amount of approbation through the success of its propaganda campaigns and well established implementation of his ideology. The perception of the Libyan society about its present

situation and government, as well as its future, had a very significant change because of several factors. First, during the 2007 approach between the Western powers and Qaddafi, he "announced a complete overhaul of the domestic economic model (…) A hint of an invitation to multinational oil companies to return to Libya has galvanized Western government policy makers in a hasty redrawing of their attitudes to this once 'pariah' country. UN trade sanctions, first imposed in 1992 and which included a ban on flights, weapons sales, oil-related exports to Libya and general freezing of international funds, were suspended in 1999" (Badcock, 2003), which created some level of expectation from the society and the opposition ideologists that would later on lead the revolution of 2011. Second, the arise if turmoil in the Arab world that included important political changes in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia generated a wave effect in many other countries that lived under autocratic regimes, provoking the gaining of momentum for the rebel movements that were already developing in Libya. The repression of protesters only served as fuel for the indignation of wide sectors if the Libyan population as well as the repudiation of the international community, causing the **balance of power** (in this particular case, both internal and external) formerly sustained by the regime to fall off stability and control.

Even with the fact that there are still important sectors of the Libyan society declaring their support to their long time leader, the fact is that if the revolution gained as much force as it did before the international intervention in the conflict, is because a significantly large part of the society supported the rebel ideology and joined the demands for change.

5.   Tactical, strategic, logistic and technological aspects

The situation has a dichotomy that is presenting itself as a mayor problem for the allied forces and the achievement of their objectives; maximalist objectives (regime change), and approval of only minimalist tactics (Zenko, 2011)

The United Nations has forbidden the NATO forces to arm the rebels, for that would mean a violation to the UN Security Council resolution 1973 and to the basic principles of neutrality of the organization.

However, to reach the main objective it is important to make an advance by land and not by air. Both parts involved know the importance to act by land; Qaddafi has the knowledge that the coalition is not going to take these actions immediately. He had already made declarations about his willingness of a complete war; he is using the **blackmail strategy** described by Mearsheimer in his work *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* to inform the coalition that he has the enough military power to fight a war against them. In public and on state TV, he is belligerent, confident and aggressive. Yet in private, it is becoming clear, Qaddafi believes he has options for an exit strategy from the trouble currently ripping his country apart. Qaddafi has always openly boasted, he will fight to the death, and he will remain in Libya. If that is his true position, then a negotiated departure is out of the question. And the uprising in Libya will be bloody and long.

In tactical matters, the coalition has made declarations about the intention of protect civilians from the regime forces; even so the real actions carried away by the NATO have make clear the support for the rebels by attacking several places of the Qaddafi's forces.

The rebels have no specific tactic except to advance according to the NATO's orders; they are begging to face a shortage of weapons and ammo and this is carrying them to ask a

rearm by the occidental powers. Leaded by the United States, the NATO does not have enough trust in the rebel armies, they don't have knowledge about their military capacities, their main objectives and the way they are going to act if the reach a real victory over Qaddafi's regime.

It is important to make clear that many national operations were carried away before NATO took control on 31 March 2011, Belgium, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, Denmark and Norway send fighter jets and special naval forces in order to start the "defense" of civilians in the Libyan territory. The main strategy take by the allied forces is to attack the military points of the Qaddafi's forces by launching missiles in specific points of the cities. The reaction of Qaddafi's militia has been denounced by the medias; the reports include several deaths of people who show their support to the Transitional National Council (rebels).

The strategy of the Qaddafi's forces has been since the begging of the insurrection, to deter the rebel movement along the country, they have been attacking the points of reunion with missiles and also with land forces facing in the territory of the main cities. Until now, that strategy work to keep the control of Tripoli, Libya's capital which is one of the highest interests of Qaddafi and in a certain way, ensure the victory to the regime forces. It is well known by the military strategists that to preserve the capital is fundamental for maintaining the structure and cohesion of the regime and bases the central strategy for both sides.

Logistic and technology aspects are important for the involved actors; the rebel forces are asking the west powers to rearm them with more technological weapons, arguing that the Qaddafi's forces has more economic solvency to buy armaments even the allies are destroying their depots.

Each military department of the states participating in the coalition collaborated with public information to make the following list of the armaments in the Libyan territory. The NATO is participating with an E-3 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft crewed by member states, which help monitor airspace over the Mediterranean and inside Libya. Spain is participating with four F-18 fighters a Boeing tanker aircraft, a submarine, and a maritime surveillance plane. The United Kingdom is making his presence with a submarine, a 12 Tornado and 10 Typhoon fighters operating from an Italian base and a surveillance aircraft. And the central actor involved in the coalition: the United States, is participating with a naval force of 11 ships, two of them amphibious, two guided-missile destroyers, two nuclear attack submarines, aircrafts, bombers and a number of CIA agents are working in Libya's ground to make intelligence work for the air strikes and to contact the rebels.

Each state is spending more than R$5 million daily just to fly a Tornado GR4, which are the jets used to patrol one sector of the Libyan airspace and another R$2 million to launch one missile; by march, the US and the UK had fired more than 110 missiles.

The logistical costs of war are being higher than the expected for the participant countries, especially if their intention is to keep it for six more months.

The Qaddafi's forces are composed of 18,000 men for the air force plus foreign mercenaries, 7 bombers, 336 fighters, 91 transport, 176 training, 136 helicopters, 216 Air defense batteries and with six types of missiles, having them in depots along the country, especially in headquarters in the Libyan dessert.

The war in Libya has not reach a limit in the armament aspect, the allied forces have decided not to enter into the Libyan soil but the idea is not far from the thoughts of the NATO and its leaders especially if that would mean the end of the Qaddafi's 40 years old regime.

Logistically speaking, Qaddafi has the advantage to know his territory and the power of his militia, whom are loyal to the regime and to him. He knows that he can get more weapons and face the allied forces, until now he has chosen the diplomatic way to get to a solution. This cannot be taken serious if the international community has already made public statements of their willingness to get Qaddafi out of the power.

Next are presented graphics that show the function of the first intervention in Libya leaded by the USA, France, and the UK from March 19 to March 27. The first two graphics' aim is to explain the way the US and its allies intended to hand over the military commando to the NATO.

Operation ODYSSEY DAWN

	Partner Total	U.S. Total	Last 24 Hours
Sorties	346	529	153
Strike Sorties	244	232	96
TLAM	7	184	16

Target Description: C2
Target Location: Tripoli

Target Description: SCUD Garrison
Target Location: Tripoli

Target Description: Maneuver Forces
Target Location: Adjabiya

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Target Description: C2 Infrastructure
Target Location: Misarath/Khoms

Target Description: IADS
Target Location: Zuwarah

Target Description: Galeb
Target Location: Misarath

Target Description: C2/IADS
Target Location: Zuwarah

TARABULUS (Tripoli)   • Misratah   Benghazi

25 Mar v. 5.1 1230 EDT   2   UNCLASSIFIED

The following is a map presenting the actual military operations of NATO in Libya and contains a brief list of the main air force capabilities and equipment of loyalists. The map is very useful to observe how the strategic location of the NATO military bases.

Libyan airforce

18,000	Personnel
7	Bombers
336	Fighters
91	Transport
176	Training
136	Helicopters
216	Air defence batteries

Air defence missiles

SA-5 Gammon, SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 GOA, SA-6 Gainful, SA-8 Gecko, Crotale-Esfir

Key
Roll over symbols on map for details ...
○ Military air base
○ Other airfield
♦ Gaddafi held
♦ Rebel held
♦ Clashes

⬤ UK air base
⬤ French air base
⬤ US air base
⬤ Air Fire power
⬤ US naval base
⬤ Libyan forces
○ Allied attacks

Potential fire power of Arab League Nations
? Likely to be involved
? Less likely
? Very unlikely

No-fly zone

Click to see targets attacked

Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/08/libya-nato-no-fly-zone-interactive-map

6.   Conclusions
- Possible scenarios

One possible outcome for the conflict would be that Qaddafi remains in power, forcing the rebels to withdraw to just one city. The NATO and the US denies rearming the rebels and taking in count that Libya lacks of political institutions, and the conflict could descend into years of a bloody civil war and eventually in a partial division of Libya in two regions: the east commanded by the rebels with a disorganization that opens the door to criminal and extremists groups that could leave the region fertile to exportation of violence and instability to other countries in the north of Africa and the Middle East. The worst outcome would be that the stalemate of the conflict lasts for years, just like Saddam Hussein, who remain in power a decade after the Gulf War.

A second outcome could it be a negotiated solution. Both parts know that time is not their friend. The NATO attacks are making the war unsustainable for Qaddafi's forces, the arms embargo and the destroying of the depots are making hard for them to set an offensive against the rebels. Besides, the opposition is taking an advantage over the oil resources of the cities it controls. This economic damage to the regime is forcing Qaddafi to search for the diplomatic and negotiation channels to solve the Libyan crisis, reason why he accepted the AU mediation. The negotiations between the West powers and the regime would be made in private, maintaining the role of alternative mediators. However, this could cause a problem In the sense that Qaddafi could win more political power in the region, making difficult for the West to act in other African countries. Even if Qaddafi remains as head of the Libyan government, countries such as France, who made an official recognition to the Transitional National Council as the new Libyan government, is not going to retract, which is going to make the international relations tenser. According to Schelling, in the **diplomatic channel**, one of the involved controls something that the other one wants and can get through negotiations or collaboration with the opposition. But the coalition (NATO forces) knows that the organization has enough military capacity to avoid any negotiation channel with Qaddafi. Until now, the NATO has shown to the Libyan dictator that it can go into war and that the exits to the conflict are the following: leave Libya and call for free and democratic elections or stay and face the consequences, situation which would highlight the dilemma of whether to use ground force to bring the conflict to an end (not very likely, given the strict limitations of the use of force stated by the UN, but quite possible if there is a strong enough event to provoke the reaction of the organism, just as it happened recently in Cote d'Ivoire). If Qaddafi remains, and pushes the conflict to the limit as he has frequently stated, the event of a large scale humanitarian crisis would probably occur.

The strategy follow then by the United States is going to be according to the popularity and the support of the Americans to Obama, the country faces presidential elections next year and he promises a "non interventionist" foreign policy, which it would mean that they are not going to send foot troops to Libya or any other country. The political and social factors in the United States are going to play an important role in the strategy define by the US government and therefore, a great share of the international posture and plan of action in regard to the situation in Libya.

Qaddafi is going to negotiate by the economic means, which includes oil, gas and other territorial advantages of Libya. It is clear that something was not going right, considering the

2007 approach between the West powers and the regime; Qaddafi has made a lot of atrocities during his regime, it is important to question what went wrong in the apparently improving relations between this two countries? It is possible to speculate over economic interests and over the internal political aims of countries such as France and the US. Gaddafi has everything to negotiate; the rebel forces are not going to survive without the military intervention of the NATO forces.

If he remains and reach a positive negotiation for the Libyan people, the African and Arab community are going to unified against the interventionist policies of the West. Iran is going to take advantage of the situation, arguing that the international community leaded by the United States is seeking to impose their system along the region, ignoring the people's will.

Turkey is going to play an important role inside the NATO decisions, being the only Muslim member; they are trying to get credibility and prestige from playing an active role in stabilizing the region. Achieving this would probably give Turkey some advantages when facing France, whom has been denying Turkey its membership to the European Union, this way Turkey can used this conflict to increase its share in the **balance of power** in order to get the entrance to the EU and showing himself as the mediator between the West powers and the Muslim world.

A third outcome could it be a total victory of one side. The Qaddafi regime could collapse; but this could only happen if the regimes army clashes against the NATO forces or if the ministers of Qaddafi's government resign to their positions, leaving Tripoli open for the rebels to take. Even so, the international community knows that the rebels are not strong enough to take the Libyan capital and that Qaddafi's forces could commit atrocities against the civilian people in the city.

The other possibility is that Gaddafi wins over the rebels and retakes the control of the country, this outcome could it be a nightmare for most of the West powers but it is also less likely to happen. The whole world's attention needed to set back from Libya's conflict in order to Qaddafi's rearm and regain power.

A fourth outcome for the conflict would be the intervention by ground troops into the Libyan territory; as the Qaddafi forces get the control of the country, the Security Council decides to send a UN peacekeeping mission to resolve the humanitarian crisis. It is important to mention that this outcome could take years for it to happen, the bureaucratic structure of the United Nations, specially the Security Council makes it difficult for the approval of a peacekeeping mission.

Qaddafi fears a ground intervention because he knows that this would be the only way to force him to leave the government and the country, death or alive; his declared intentions are to remain and defy the West powers, specially the US. If they have success in the mission of remove Qaddafi, the instauration of other government could take time. Libya is full of Islamic extremist that could take control of the government and destabilize the Arab world.

President Obama just stated that his administration has asked to submit all eventualities and possibilities within the framework of the Lebanese crisis management. It is understood that Americans could project a direct intervention. The British have begun to sound out public opinion by declaring that they will not hesitate to organize a military operation aimed at repatriating its citizens who are currently in Libya.

Of course the U.S. military intervention or NATO, under UN approval, need not necessarily resemble the invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq, but such intervention would be enough to remove the Gaddafi regime if it continues to benefit from the help of foreign mercenaries? President Obama declared his administration is in negotiations with its allies to coordinate the next steps. Does it refer only to its NATO allies? Or also includes their "allies" neighboring Arab states: Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen and Tunisia, which are running the risk of being hit directly by the evolution of the Libyan crisis and that are now facing some symptoms of contagion of protests and democratic demands.

Libya's future could end in a U.S. base of operations in the region. A country of 6 million people but which has a GDP of 100,000 million dollars, or the equivalent of two thirds of GDP in Egypt has 85 million inhabitants may indeed make a difference in one direction as the other. The strategic level control of Libya is not at all a minor issue for the US foreign policy. For the people of Libya, there can be no quick fix. Not only will the post-invasion Libyan state lack the means to the right institutions to defend its sovereignty externally, a post-invasion Libyan government will need to hold a highly fractured society through patient coalition-building, if Libyan society is not to disintegrate into an Afghan-style civil war (Tahar Bensaada, 2011)

Of all the outcomes discussed before it is important to question if the Libyan people is going to be capable to choose the one that corresponds to their aspirations weather that takes them to a democratic regime or not. The stalemate of the conflict it's only going to bring an environment of instability in the region. "The Arab spring" is affecting the balances of power trough out the international system and it's proving the lack of capability and incongruence inside international organizations such as the UN. Furthermore, it will become the defining momentum for the future unfolding of world conflict in terms of the rearrangements of the international power structure.

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